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Abstract
We develop a model in which delinquents compete with each other in criminal activities but may beneﬁt
from being friends with other criminals by learning and acquiring proper know-how on the crime business.
By taking the social network connecting agents as given, we study the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of
this game in which individuals decide ﬁrst to work or to become a criminal and then the crime eﬀort provided
if criminals. We show that this game always has a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that
we characterize. Ex ante identical individuals connected through a network can end up with very diﬀerent
equilibrium outcomes: either employed, or isolated criminal or criminals in networks. We also show that
multiple equilibria with diﬀerent number of active criminals and levels of involvement in crime activities
may coexist and are only driven by the geometry of the pattern of links connecting criminals. Using the
equilibrium concept of pairwise-stable networks, we then show that the multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes
holds even when we allow for endogenous network formation.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Stark diﬀerences in crime rates are commonly observed across diﬀerent social groups and/or locations dis-
playing otherwise identical economic fundamentals. One of the main explanations put forward to account for
this puzzle is the presence of social multiplier eﬀects on individual crime decisions. Social multiplier eﬀects
arise when, as the result of social interactions, individual decisions feed each other and, altogether, generate
a premium for the observed aggregate outcome.1
In the criminology/sociology literature, the inﬂuence of friends on criminal behavior has been acknowl-
edged for a long time (see, e.g., Shaw and McKay 1942, Sutherland 1947, Sarnecki 2001 and War 2002).2
In economics, the empirical evidence collected so far suggests that peer eﬀects are, indeed, very strong in
criminal decisions. For instance, Case and Katz (1991), using data from the 1989 NBER survey of youths
living in low-income Boston neighborhoods, ﬁnd that a 10 percent increase in the neighborhood juvenile
crime rate increases the individual probability to become a delinquent by 2.3 percent. Also, using data from
the Moving to Opportunity experiment, Ludwig et al. (2001) estimate that relocating families from high-
to low-poverty neighborhoods reduces juvenile arrests for violent oﬀences by 30 to 50 percent of the arrest
rate for control groups.3
Even though the empirical literature emphasizes the role of social interactions in crime behavior, theo-
retical economic models accounting for this fact are a bit scarcer. The aim of this paper is precisely to study
the role of social networks and social structure in facilitating criminal behavior.
For this purpose, we develop a model of crime decision where delinquents exert both a positive and a
negative externality on each other. More precisely, we assume that delinquents compete with each other
in criminal activities, but beneﬁt from being friends with other criminals by learning and acquiring proper
know-how on the crime business. The negative externality induced by the competition for the booty is
global, and aﬀects all criminals in the crime pool. On the contrary, the positive externality of know-how
sharing is of local nature, and is tailored to the details of the local geometry of friendship links. Throughout,
the network of social contacts is modelled by a graph where nodes stem for the players and links represent
direct friendship relationships. Following the standard crime model (Becker, 1968), each individual has to
make a choice between becoming a criminal and participating in the labor market (these two activities being
mutually exclusive) by implementing a cost-beneﬁt analysis. The geometry of the network links and the
local positive externalities they induce are a key determinant of individual crime decisions.
In the ﬁrst part of the paper, the social network connecting agents is exogenously given. We analyze
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game in which individuals decide ﬁr s tt ow o r ko rt ob e c o m ea
criminal and then the crime eﬀort provided if criminals. We consider two cases: general networks, that have
1With respect to what would be observed if individual outcomes were merely juxtaposed to each other, without cross
inﬂuences of any sort.
2For instance, in their seminal study, Shaw and McKay (1942) show that delinquent boys in certain areas of US cities have
contact not only with other delinquents who are their contemporaries but also with older oﬀenders, who in turn had contact
with delinquents preceding them, and so on ... This contact means that the traditions of delinquency can be and are transmitted
down through successive generations of boys and across members of the same generation, in much the same way that language
and other social forms are transmitted.
3Two more recent papers by Chen and Shapiro (2003) and Bayer, Pintoﬀ and Pozen (2003) ﬁnd also strong peer eﬀects in
crime by investigating the inﬂuence individuals serving time in the same facility have on the subsequent criminal behavior of
oﬀenders. The former shows that worsening prison conditions signiﬁcantly increases post-release crime. The latter provides
strong evidence that, for many types of crimes, learning is signiﬁcantly enhanced by access to peers with experience with that
crime.
2arbitrary geometry, and regular networks, in which each criminal has exactly t h es a m en u m b e ro fl i n k s . 4 For
general networks, we establish conditions under which this game always has a pure strategy subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium that we fully characterize. One of our main result is to show that diﬀerent equilibria with
diﬀerent number of active criminals and diﬀering levels of involvement in crime activities may coexist. Thus
ex ante identical individuals connected through a network can end up with very diﬀerent equilibrium outcomes:
either employed, or isolated criminal or criminals in networks. This ex post heterogeneity is amenable to the
presence of geometric asymmetries in the locations held by individuals in the original network (some being
initially very well-connected, some not), and to the corresponding graph-theoretical restrictions inherited
by the geometry of the sub-graphs of the original graph.5 With regular networks, we obtain a closed-form
expression for equilibrium crime eﬀort levels and conclude that the social setting and its tightness have a
multiplier eﬀect on aggregate observed crime levels, which we refer to as the network eﬀect on crime. The
social network is thus a channel both for equilibrium multiplicity and for multiplier eﬀects.6
In the second part of the paper, we explicitly deal with the issue of endogenous network formation. Using
the equilibrium concept of pairwise-stable networks (i.e. a network is pairwise-stable if no player gains by
cutting an existing link, and no two players gain by forming a new link), we show that all complete networks
as well as all induced networks that are complete are pairwise stable. We also show that, both for general
and regular networks, the multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes holds even when we allow for endogenous
network formation. In this case, the multiplicity of equilibria is not directly driven by the geometry of the
network connecting players. Rather, it is indirectly related to the network modelling approach and reﬂects
the structural coordination problem that plagues decentralized procedures of network formation.
To link social interactions with crime is not new as it has been done in partial equilibrium setups
(Sah, 1991, and Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 1996, 2002), in dynamic general equilibrium models
(˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, Merlo and Rupert, 2000, and Lochner, 2002) and in search-theoretic frameworks (Burdett,
Lagos and Wright, 2003, 2004, and Huang, Laing and Wang, 2003). What is new, however, is to study the
impact of the network structure and its geometric details on individual and aggregate criminal behavior,
and to show that the social setting is a new plausible channel for equilibrium multiplicity.
In Sah (1991), the social setting only aﬀects the individual perception of the costs of crime, and is thus
conducive to a higher or a lower sense of impunity. In our model, the social network leads to a higher or a
lower real impunity or vulnerability to punishment as it aﬀects the available know-how or crime technology.
As in Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996), criminal interconnections act as a social multiplier on
aggregate crime. Contrary to this paper, though, our model does not posit any ex ante heterogeneity across
agents, neither it is restricted to the particular case of regular lattices. Rather, the interaction structure
is modelled as a general graph that connects ex ante homogenous individuals. Our results then relate the
details of the geometry of the network links to individual and aggregate outcomes. In particular, we show
4Consider a population of n a g e n t s .T h e nb o t ht h ecomplete graph (in which each agent is in direct relationship with every
other agents so that each has n−1 direct contacts) and the circle (in which each agent has two direct contacts) are examples of
regular networks where all agents have the same number of direct contacts and, thus, hold symmetric positions in the network.
By contrast, in a star-shaped network (where one central agent is in direct contact with all the other peripheral agents who, in
turn, are only connected to this central agentin the star), agents hold very asymmetric positions, as one agent has n − 1 direct
links while all the other agents only have 1 direct link. General networks with arbitrary geometry encompass all these cases.
5That may arise even when the original graph is regular, as in the example with n =4agents on a circle.
6Networks of contacts also play a central role in labor markets by disseminating information among workers and by matching
job-seekers with vacancies. Calvó-Armengol (2003) and Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2003a, 2003b) propose respectively a
static and a dynamic model of the labor market that accounts for the social network through which agents hear about jobs,
and displaying multiplicity of equilibria and social multiplier eﬀects.
3that the social multiplier eﬀect on crime increases with the density of the pattern of connections.7
˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, Merlo and Rupert (2000) and Lochner (2002) both propose dynamic general equilibrium
models in which social interactions are introduced via political economy (majority voting) and education
respectively. Our approach is quite diﬀerent since the model is static and the social setting is modeled by a
network of relationships in which friends give information on how to reduce the probability to be caught.
Finally, recent studies use search-matching models to analyze crime behavior (Burdett, Lagos and Wright,
2003, 2004, and Huang, Laing and Wang, 2003). All these models generate multiple equilibria, as in our
framework. However, the mechanisms at work are quite diﬀerent. In the search approach, the strategic
interaction in wage setting can be the source of multiple equilibria (Burdett, Lagos and Wright, 2003,
2004),8 while in our model, it is mainly the structure of the network that is responsible for it.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we present the model. Section 3 deals with
exogenous networks while endogenous networks are studied in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes. All
proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The model
The network N = {1,...,n} is a ﬁnite set of agents. Agents are connected by a network of social
connections. We represent social connections by a graph g,w h e r egij =1if i knows j and gij =0otherwise.
Links are taken to be reciprocal, so that gij = gji.B yc o n v e n t i o n ,gii =0 .
Individual actions Agents may either be criminals or participate in the labor force. Agents in the
labor force earn a wage w, while those involved in criminal activities receive an expected payoﬀ equal to:
di = pi (yi − f)+( 1− pi)yi = yi − pif,
where yi is i’s booty, pi his probability to be caught and f the corresponding ﬁne.
Agents choose between entering the labor market or becoming a criminal based on the payoﬀs attached
to those activities, respectively w and di.9 Criminals also decide how much eﬀort ei > 0 they devote to
delinquent behavior. By convention, ei =0means that agent i enters the labor market.
Denote by e =( e1,...,e n) a population crime eﬀort proﬁle and by e−i the crime eﬀort proﬁle of all agents
but i.W ea s s u m et h a tt h eb o o t yyi of some criminal i depends on e the following way. First, ∂yi (e)/∂ei ≥ 0,
7Another related contribution is Verdier and Zenou (2004) where the focus is on the geographical space. If everybody believes
that blacks are more criminal than whites (even if there is no basis for this), they show that ex ante identical agents who only
diﬀer by the color of their skin (blacks versus whites) may have very diﬀerent outcomes in terms of crime behavior because of
amplifying eﬀects. It is because the authors consider the complete interactions of three markets (crime, labor and housing) and
because workers rationally anticipate these interactions that they obtain these magniﬁcation results.
8In Huang, Laing and Wang (2003) multiple equilibria stem from three eﬀects: the interdiction eﬀect (higher crime rate
reduces the likelihood that any given criminal is interdicted by the authorities, which in turn lowers the expected costs of
committing crime), the appropriation eﬀect (higher crime rate lowers the expected returns to formal employment) and the human
capital eﬀect (higher crime rate reduces human capital accumulation, which discourages ﬁrms from entering the community,
which raises unemployment and thus crime).
9Because our model is quite complex, the labor market is kept as simple as possible. However, friends provide information not
only on crime but also on job opportunities. The interaction between these two networks (crime and labor market) is certainly
an important feature of crime decisions since delinquents have in general few employed friends who can provide information
about jobs. The issue is investigated in Calvó-Armengol, Verdier and Zenou (2003) in a context of much simplier networks in
which individuals only belong to mutually exclusive two-person groups (dyads).
4that is, the individual booty increase with one’s involvement in crime ei > 0.S e c o n d ,∂yi (e)/∂e−i ≤ 0,10
which reﬂects rivalry or competition in individual crime gross payoﬀs.
Network payoﬀs Besides from being competitors in the crime market, criminals may also beneﬁt
from having criminal mates. This beneﬁt may take the form of know-how sharing about delinquent behavior
between individuals that know each other. We assume that the higher the criminal connections to a crim-
inal and/or the higher the involvement in criminal activities of these connections, the lower his individual
probability to be caught. The idea is as follows. There is no formal way of learning to become a criminal, no
proper “school” providing an organized transmission of the objective skills needed to undertake successful
criminal activities. Given this lack of formal institutional arrangement, we believe that the most natural
and eﬃcient way to learn to become a criminal is throu g ht h ei n t e r a c t i o nw i t ho t h e rc r i m i n a l s . 11 Delin-
quents learn from other criminals belonging to the same network how to commit crime in a more eﬃcient
way by sharing the know-how about the “technology” of crime. In our model, we capture this local nature
of the mechanism through which skills are acquired by relating the individual probability to be caught to
the crime level involvement of one’s direct mates, and by assuming that this probability decreases with the
corresponding local aggregate level of crime. In other words, in our model, individuals learn illegal conduct
from others but practice it alone.
Formally, given a network g and a crime proﬁle e, ∂pi (e)/∂ej ≤ 0 whenever gij =1 .W e a l s o a s s u m e
that ∂pi (e)/∂ei ≥ 0, that is, the probability to be caught increases with one’s exposure to crime.
As a result, because of our two assumptions, ∂yi (e)/∂e−i ≤ 0 and ∂pi (e)/∂ej ≤ 0 whenever gij =1 .
Criminal friends (social connections) create both positive and negative externalities between each other. The
competitive eﬀect acts as a negative externality exerted by every individual criminal to every other individual
in the delinquent pool. By contrast, the positive externality in the form of know-how is only exerted at the
local level, among those directly connected individuals. The span and intensity of this latter externality is
determined by the shape of the social network and varies across individuals (and their graph locations) with
the geometry of the network of links. In particular, ex ante identical individuals holding asymmetric network
locations face diﬀerent externality intensities. Because these externalities are at the heart of the cost-beneﬁt
analysis undertaken at the individual level, the equilibrium pattern of network decisions is likely to reﬂect
ex post heterogeneity among individuals. In solving the tension between the two forces, the geometry of the
network of connections plays a major role, that we explore.
Given a ﬁne f, the individual expected gains from becoming a criminal are thus di (e,f,g)=yi (e) −








Letting φ = p0f denote the marginal expected punishment cost for an isolated agent, individual expected





j∈N ej) − φei(1 −
P
j∈N gijej),i fei > 0
w,i fei =0
(1)
10For the component-wise ordering for e−i.
11Sutherland (1947) and Akers (1998) expressly argue that criminal behavior is learned from others in the same way that all
human behavior is learned. Indeed, young people may be inﬂuenced by their peers in all categories of behavior - music, speech,
dress, sports, and delinquency.
5The crime decision game Consider some given network g connecting individuals, a wage w>0,a n d
a marginal expected punishment cost for an isolated individual φ. Consider the following two-stage decision
game.
In the ﬁrst stage, players in N decide to enter the labor market or to become criminals. This is a simple
binary decision.
In the second stage, all players who have decided to become criminals choose non-cooperatively the crime
eﬀort level ei > 0 they provide.
The payoﬀs corresponding to this game are given in (1). To simplify notations, we do not explicitly
describe the strategies of this sequential game. The decision to enter the labor market (resp. become a
criminal) at the ﬁrst stage is implicitly captured by setting ei =0(resp. ei > 0) at the second stage.
Observe that the payoﬀ πi(ei,e −i) for player i as a function of ei is discontinuous at 0. Observe also that
payoﬀs depend on the underlying network connecting players. To be more precise, only those network links
that connect active criminals among themselves inﬂuence such payoﬀs. Hence, the actual network topology
that indeed aﬀects payoﬀs is shaped by the strategies adopted by the players. The impact of individual
decisions on the criminals’ network and on payoﬀs thus goes either ways. This interplay between individual
strategies and interaction structure is at the heart of our analysis.
We denote the crime decision game by Γ(w,φ,g).
3 Exogenous networks
In this section, we ﬁrst characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies of the crime
decision game for any network geometry connecting players. We also provide an algorithm to compute such
equilibria for general networks. Then, for the particular class of networks with a regular geometry, that is,
such that all players in the network have exactly the same number of direct links, we analyze some properties
of the corresponding equilibria for which we obtain closed-form expressions.
3.1 General networks








with cross-derivatives ∂2di/∂ei∂ej = −1+φgij.W h e n φ < 1,c r i m ee ﬀort decisions are strategic substi-
tutes, while when φ ≥ 1,c r i m ee ﬀort decisions are (local) strategic complements, that is, gij =1implies
∂2di/∂ei∂ej ≥ 0.12 In this latter case, the equilibria of the crime decision game are simple to characterize.
Lemma 1 When φ ≥ 1, at the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of Γ(w,φ,g), all agents enter the
labor force.
From now on we restrict to the case φ < 1.
In what follows, we characterize all the subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies of Γ(w,φ,g).
We proceed backwards. To obtain the Nash equilibria of the second-stage game, we introduce an auxiliary
game
12Strictly speaking, crime eﬀorts are strategic substitutes or strategic complements insofar we ignore the outside opportunity
to enter the labor force or, equivalently, we set w = −∞.
6The auxiliary game Consider the following game played on the network g. Players in N select an
eﬀort level ei ∈ IR, and player i’s payoﬀsa r edi (e,φ,g). Denote this game by Γ∗ (φ,g).
Lemma 2 There exists a ﬁnite set Z ∈ IR such that, for all φ ∈ (0,1)\Z and all networks g,t h es e to f
Nash equilibria in pure strategies of Γ∗ (φ,g) exists and is unique.
We refer to the situations in which φ / ∈ Z as generic situations. Since Z is a ﬁnite set, the whole set of
nongeneric situations has Lebesgue measure of zero. For the equilibrium analysis, we restrict from now on
to generic situations.
For all φ and g,d e n o t eb ye∗ (φ,g)=( e∗
1 (φ,g),...,e ∗
n (φ,g)) ∈ IR
n the unique Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies of Γ∗ (φ,g). This equilibrium is easy to obtain. It is the unique solution to the following linear




(1 − φgij)ej =1− φ,i∈ N.( 2 )
The following result states that for small enough values of φ, active criminals exert a non-negative crime
eﬀort at the unique Nash equilibrium of the auxiliary game.
Lemma 3 There exists a unique 0 < φ ≤ 1 such that, for all φ < φ, the unique Nash equilibrium of Γ∗ (φ,g)
is such that e∗
i ≥ 0,f o ra l li ∈ N.
From now on, we restrict to the case where φ < φ.
Induced subnetworks Consider some network g on N.
Deﬁnition 1 For all subset S ⊂ N of players in N,l e tg(S) be such that gij (S)=1if and only if both
gij =1and i,j ∈ S. We say that g(S) is the network induced by g on S.
The network g(S) is obtained the following way. Originally, all agents in N are connected according to
the network g. Suppose now that we eliminate some player i. By eliminating player i,w ea l s oe l i m i n a t ea l l
the direct links in the original network g stemming from i.W ed e n o t eb yg(N\{i}) the resulting network
on the remaining population N\{i},t h a tw et e r mthe network induced by g on N\{i}. More generally, the
network g(S) induced by g on some given subset S of agents is obtained by eliminating in g every node
corresponding to an agent in N\S and every direct link stemming from those agents.
In general, the geometry of the network g(S) induced by g on S depends not only on the total number
|S| of players being removed from the original network, but also on the precise identity of the players in the
set S.13 This is best illustrated with a simple example.
Suppose, for instance, that g is a star centered on i.F o r m a l l y ,g 6= ∅,a n djk ∈ g implies that either j = i
or k = i. Consider some subset S ⊂ N. Then, if i ∈ S, the induced network g(S) i sa l s oas t a rc e n t e r e do n
i, while if i/ ∈ S, g(S)=∅.
The outcome of the ﬁrst-stage game is a partition of the population in a set S of criminals and a set
N\S of workers, together with the network g(S) induced by g on the pool S of criminals. By the remark
13Formally, the set {g(S):S ⊂ N} of induced networks generated by g e m b e d d e dw i t ht h ei n c l u s i o no r d e r i n go nn e t w o r k s
is a lattice, namely, it is a partially ordered set for this network inclusion ordering, and it both contains the union and the
intersection of each pair of its elements.
7above, the geometry of g(S) generally depends on the precise label of the players in the criminal pool. As
we will see below, this implies that the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the crime decision game is
generally not unique.
The subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the crime decision game T h es u b g a m ep e r f e c tN a s h
equilibria of Γ(w,φ,g) are obtained from the Nash equilibria of the auxiliary game Γ∗ (φ,g(S)) played by
subsets of players S ⊂ N and connected by the corresponding induced network g(S).
The way we compute the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is as follows. Given n agents in the economy,
we start with a given graph of relationships that could have any shape. We then compute the Nash equilibria
in crime-eﬀort levels of the auxiliary game for all possible subsets of criminals S, i.e., we determine the crime
eﬀorts e∗
i (φ,g(S)), i ∈ S for such players. Note that the network of know-how sharing among a given
subset S ⊂ N of criminals is given by the network g(S) induced on S by the initial graph.14 We then look
at all the induced graphs of criminals that are indeed sustainable as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,
where agents compare crime beneﬁts with the outside option provided by the labor market (i.e. no unilateral
deviation shall be proﬁtable for neither type of agents, nor criminal, nor worker). Subgame perfect Nash
equilibria are thus characterized by the subset S of active criminals, the network g(S) connecting them, and
the corresponding crime eﬀort levels. All remaining players in N\S are workers. The network g(S) induced
by the initial graph on S and connecting active criminals is unambiguously deﬁned.
To be more precise, for all S ⊂ N,d e n o t eb ye∗ (φ,g(S)) the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies









j (φ,g(S ∪ {j})) | j/ ∈ S
ª
, for all S ⊂ N,S 6= N
m(φ,N)=0
We have the following result:
Proposition 1 Let S ⊂ N.I fm(φ,S) >
√
w> m (φ,S) ≥ 0, then the crime decision proﬁle e =( e1,...,en)
where ei = e∗
i (φ,g(S)) for all i ∈ S,a n dei =0otherwise is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of Γ(w,φ,g).
Moreover, all the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of Γ(w,φ,g) are of this sort.
In equilibrium, individual decisions are consistent across players and no unilateral deviation is proﬁtable.
Here, the implications are twofold. First, no active criminal in S gains by exerting a diﬀerent eﬀort level.
This is true because the vector of crime eﬀorts is an equilibrium of the auxiliary game Γ∗ (φ,g(S)) played
by such criminals.
Second, no worker gains by becoming a criminal, neither a criminal gains by becoming a worker, which is
equivalent to m(φ,S) >
√
w> m (φ,S). Indeed, the payoﬀ t oac r i m i n a le x e r t i n ga ne ﬀort e∗




2 >w ,n oc r i m i n a li nS gains by entering the labor force. Symmetrically,
when w>m(φ,S)
2,n ow o r k e ri nN\S gains by entering the crime business.
14Links in g\g (S) connect workers to workers or workers to criminals. Therefore, no actual know-how is being shared between
the end nodes of such connections, and links in g\g (S) are redundant at every equilibrium where only agents in S are criminals.
15Recall that e∗(φ,g(S)) is a Nash equilibrium of Γ∗(φ,g(S)) or, equivalently, the unique solution to the system of equations
(2). Therefore,
e∗





By deﬁnition, and after some manipulation, di (e∗)=e∗
i [(1 − φ) −
P
j∈N(1 − φgij)e∗
j], implying that di(e∗)=e∗2
i .
8Proposition 1 does not establish uniqueness of the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of Γ(w,φ,g).I nf a c t ,





holds for two diﬀerent subsets S and S0 of players. Note that m(φ,S) and m(φ,S) depend both on S and
on the geometry of the network g(S) induced by g on S, as can be seen from equations (2) from which
e∗
i (φ,g(S)), i ∈ S are calculated. Given the lattice structure of the set of induced networks, it may well
b et h ec a s et h a tt w os u b s e t sS and S0 connected through two induced networks g(S) and g(S0) of diﬀerent
geometry both satisfy (3). This may be true with two subsets S and S0 of either identical or diﬀerent size.
If S and S0 have diﬀerent sizes, then the number of active criminals diﬀers across the two corresponding
equilibria of Γ(w,φ,g).I fS and S0 have identical size, there is exactly the same number of criminals in both
equilibria. Yet, because g(S) and g(S0) may diﬀer, both the individual and the aggregate crime eﬀort level
are generally diﬀerent across the two equilibria.
Thus, one of our main result is to demonstrate that diﬀerent equilibria with diﬀerent number of active
criminals and diﬀering levels of involvement in crime activities may coexist. Note that this multiplicity of
equilibria is obtained with ex ante identical agents, and is only driven by the geometry of the pattern of links
connecting them. Note also that multiplicity of equilibria, as obtained in our model, is consistent with the
high (unexplained) variance of crime levels across geographic locations (see, e.g., Glaeser, Sacerdote and
Scheinkman, 1996).
The existence of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies of Γ(w,φ,g) is a side-product of the
previous characterization result.
Corollary 1 For all w,φ and g, the crime decision game Γ(w,φ,g) has a pure strategy subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium.
Example Consider n =4players arranged on a circle g where each player has exactly two direct
contacts. Fix φ ∈ (0,1). Then, any of the crime pattern depicted in Figure 1 can be sustained as a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium for a suitable wage range.16 Criminals (resp. workers) are depicted with full (resp.

























Figure 1. Crime decision equilibrium patterns for n =4players on a circle.
16In fact, g (1,3) can only emerge at equilibrium under some conditions both on w and on φ. See the appendix for more
details.
9For some wage range, both the set of players {1,2} and the set of players {1,3} can constitute the pool
of active criminals at equilibrium.17 Note that, in both cases, there are exactly two criminals at equilibrium.
Yet, the aggregate crime rate is higher when criminals are in {1,2} than in {1,3}. Indeed, criminals in {1,2}
connected by g(1,2) are direct network mates, while criminals in {1,3} connected by g(1,3) do not know
each other. As such, with g(1,2), criminals possess a higher know-how on the crime business than with
g(1,3) and exert a higher individual crime eﬀort level. This is in accordance with the empirical ﬁndings of
Thornberry et al. (2003) who show that networks of criminals or gangs amplify delinquent behaviors
When the set of criminals at equilibrium is {1,2,3}, active criminals hold asymmetric positions in the
corresponding know-how sharing network g(1,2,3). Indeed, player 2 has two direct links with players 1 and
3, while the latter are only connected to player 2. At equilibrium, criminal 2 exerts a higher crime eﬀort
than criminals 1 and 3, reﬂecting the comparative knowledge advantage accruing from his central position
in the network.
Finally, individual crime eﬀorts decrease with the mass of active criminals across the diﬀerent equilibria,
which corresponds to a crowding out eﬀect that results from competition for the booty.
3.2 Regular networks
In order to obtain closed-form solutions, we now focus on regular networks.
In a regular network, all agents have the same number of direct contacts k,t h a ti s ,
X
j∈N
gij = k, for all i ∈ N.
We refer to k a st h ed e g r e eo fg. For instance, the network connecting n =4players in the previous example
is a regular network of degree 2, where each player has exactly two links.
The following result provides a general characterization of the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the
crime decision game where criminals, at equilibrium, are connected through a regular network.
Proposition 2 At every subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of Γ(w,φ,g) with a set of criminals S,a n dw h e r e





,f o ra l li ∈ S.
According to the previous expression, an increase in the per individual number of links k raises criminal
eﬀort. The aggregate level of crime
P
i∈S e∗
i also depends positively on the degree of the criminals’ network.
Criminal interconnections thus generate a crime level premium18 that increases with the density of intercon-
nections among criminals. The social setting and its tightness have a multiplier eﬀect on aggregate observed
crime levels which we refer to as the network eﬀect on crime.
Also, both individual and aggregate crime decrease with the number |S| of active criminals, which cor-
responds to the crowding-out eﬀect on the booty induced by competition among criminals. Finally, the








4+4φ−2φ2 . This wage range condition is non-empty whenever φ < e φ,f o rs o m eu n i q u e l y
deﬁned e φ ∈ (0,1). See the appendix for more details.
18With respect to the case where social interactions among criminals are absent.
10The previous characterization result does not guarantee existence of symmetric equilibria of the crime
decision game on regular networks. Here, the equilibrium existence problem is, essentially, a graph-theoretical
existence problem. It amounts to identifying topological conditions on the original network g such that g(S)
be regular of degree k. We ignore this problem by focusing on a particular type of networks where these
topological conditions are always met and existence is trivially guaranteed.
Suppose that the initial network connecting players is the complete graph gN on N,w h e r ee v e r yp l a y e r
is directly linked to every other player, that is, gN
ij =1 , for all i 6= j.I ngN, each player has exactly n − 1
connections.
Let S ⊂ N. Then, in the network gN (S) induced by gN on S,e v e r yp l a y e ri nS is directly linked to
every other player in S. In words, the network induced by gN on any subset S of N i st h ec o m p l e t eg r a p h










For simplicity, assume that n ≥ s∗ (w,φ).
Corollary 2 If
√




exactly s∗ (w,φ) criminals fully interconnected and n − s∗ (w,φ) workers. The criminal eﬀort levels are:
e∗ =
1 − φ
1+φ + s∗ (w,φ)(1− φ)
.
With fully interconnected networks, aggregate crime increases with the total number of active criminals
but at a decreasing rate.19
More precisely, with complete networks, the criminal size pool has both a positive and a negative eﬀect
on aggregate crime. First, crowding-out implies that aggregate crime decreases. Second, in a complete
network, the individual number of links increases with the total number of criminals and, by the network
eﬀect, aggregate crime increases.
The network eﬀect on crime also implies that the elasticity of aggregate crime with respect to the
deterrence eﬀort φ is a decreasing and concave function of φ.
4 Endogenous networks
In our model, the payoﬀs accruing to criminals depend both on their involvement in crime and on the
underlying network connecting them. In the previous section, the network was exogenous and criminals
select the crime eﬀort level they wish to exert. In this section, networks become a manipulable device and
criminals decide also with whom to establish links.
Pairwise-stable networks Consider some payoﬀ function u(g)=( u1 (g),...,u n (g)) that assigns a
payoﬀ to every agent in N as a function of the underlying network g connecting them. The concept of
pairwise-stability introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) provides a network equilibrium notion that
delivers sharp results for our analysis.
We denote by g + ij (resp. g − ij) the network obtained by adding (resp. deleting) ij to (resp. from) g.
19Formally, ∂(s∗e∗)/∂s∗ > 0 and ∂2(s∗e∗)/∂s∗2 < 0.
11Deﬁnition 2 An e t w o r kg is pairwise-stable for the payoﬀ function u if and only if for all ij ∈ g, ui(g) ≥
ui(g − ij),a n df o ra l lij / ∈ g, uk (g) >u k (g + ij) for some k ∈ {i,j}.
In words, a network is pairwise-stable if no player gains by cutting an existing link, and no two players
gain by forming a new link. Pairwise-stability thus only checks for one-link deviations.20 It requires that
any mutually beneﬁcial link be formed at equilibrium but does not allow for multi-link severance.
Pairwise-stable networks can be interpreted as the limiting graphs of a dynamic procedure of network
formation. Suppose, indeed, that players myopically add or sever links to improve their current status, and
that only one link is added or removed at a time. When this process converges, the networks ultimately
reached are pairwise-stable.21
Pairwise-stability in the crime decision game Consider some crime decision game Γ(w,φ,g).
Let S be the set of active criminals at some subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of Γ(w,φ,g). Criminals in S
are connected by the induced network g(S). Their payoﬀs are given by the unique Nash equilibrium outcome
of the crime eﬀort game Γ∗ (φ,g(S)). These payoﬀs depend on the geometry of the network connecting
them. Some criminals may thus have incentives to manipulate the network at their advantage. Therefore,
the network g(S) need not necessarily be pairwise-stable for the Nash equilibrium payoﬀso ft h ec r i m ee ﬀort
game.
4.1 Regular networks
We ﬁrst analyze regular networks. Because of the graph-theoretical existence problem of regular networks
mentioned in section 3.2, we focus on a particular class of induced sub-networks: complete ones. The
following result establishes that the criminal network is always pairwise-stable in any equilibrium where the
set of criminals is fully interconnected, that is, when the graph connecting criminals is the complete network.
Proposition 3 Consider some subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of Γ(w,φ,g) where the set of criminals is
S and where g(S)=gS. Then, gS is pairwise-stable for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoﬀso ft h e
crime eﬀort game played by criminals in S.
When the pool of criminals is fully interconnected (complete network), they all exert the same crime
eﬀort. For any of such criminals, deleting one existing link amounts to receiving relatively less know-how on
the crime business than the rest of criminals, and thus weakening ones’ position in the competition for the
booty, hitherto receiving a lower payoﬀ. The fully interconnected network is thus pairwise-stable.
Observe that this proposition does not require that the initial graph be complete. It says that, if the
induced sub-network is complete, at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, this sub-network is also pairwise
stable.
4.2 General networks
At equilibrium, all pairwise-stable criminal networks, though, are not necessarily fully interconnected. We
illustrate this fact with an example.
20This weak equilibrium concept is often interpreted as a necessary conditions for stronger stability concepts.
21Note that network transitions only concern one link at at time. The dynamics may thus lock in (the set of limiting graphs
need not be unique) or cycle. See Jackson and Watts (2002) for more details.
12Consider a population of n =4players. The possible equilibria of the crime decision game, satisfying the
added requirement that the network connecting criminals be pairwise-stable, are depicted in Figure 2 as a





Figure 2. Pairwise-stable networks for the crime decision game as a function of w and φ for n =4 .
First, as established in Proposition 3, all active criminals being fully interconnected is a pairwise-stable
network for every possible size of the criminal pool.
Second, with four active criminals, pairwise-stability is also obtained with a highly asymmetric network
where three criminals are fully interconnected while one criminal is completely isolated. Moreover, for
a certain region of the parameters’ space, this asymmetric network and the complete network are both
pairwise stable.
In this region of the parameters’ space, when a group of three players is fully interconnected and forms a
triad, the isolated player has not incentives to set a link with any of the players in the triad. Indeed, setting
a new link has both a positive and a negative eﬀect. First, know-how increases for the newly linked players,
which is beneﬁcial to both of them. Second, the newly linked partners exert a higher competitive pressure to
22Alternatively, consider the following three-stage game of network formation and crime decision. In the ﬁrst stage, agents
decide non-cooperatively with whom they wish to form links to share their know-how with. We assume that links are formed
only when the mutual consent of the two concerned players is obtained. At the end of this ﬁrst stage, a network of links is
obtained. The second and the third stage then correspond to the crime decision game played on the network outcome of stage
one. The potential multiplicity of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes for the second and third stage crime decision
game challenges a full-ﬂedged equilibrium analysis of this three-stage game of network formation and crime decision. In the
particular case where n =4 , though, the set of subgame perfect equilibria that satisfy the added requirement that any mutually
beneﬁcial link be formed at equilibrium coincide with the set of pairwise-stable networks in Figure 2.
13the rest of players, which is detrimental to everybody, including themselves. Here, due to the asymmetry of
links across players in the original graph, setting a link has an overall negative eﬀect for the isolated player.
Absent mutual consent, this link is not formed, and the original asymmetric network is pairwise-stable.23
5C o n c l u s i o n
The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework that explains the observed diﬀerences in crime
rates across locations displaying otherwise identical economic fundamentals. For that, we have developed
a model in which delinquents compete with each other in criminal activities but may beneﬁtf r o mb e i n g
friends with other criminals by learning and acquiring proper know-how on the crime business. By taking
the social network connecting agents as given, we have studied the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this
game in which individuals decide ﬁrst to work or to become a criminal and then the crime eﬀort provided if
criminals. We have showed that this game always has a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that
we characterize. Ex ante identical individuals connected through a network can end up with very diﬀerent
equilibrium outcomes: either employed, or isolated criminal or criminals in networks.
We have also showed that multiple equilibria with diﬀerent number of active criminals and levels of
involvement in crime activities may coexist. This multiplicity of equilibria is driven by the geometry of
the pattern of links connecting criminals. Therefore, according to our analysis, diﬀerent locations with the
same economic fundamentals need not experience the same crime level when the social arrangements diﬀer
across these areas. Our approach is general and allows for as many interaction structures as diﬀerent graph
geometries.24
Using the equilibrium concept of pairwise stability, we then show that the multiplicity of equilibrium
outcomes holds even when we allow for endogenous network formation. In this case, the multiplicity of
equilibria is not directly driven by the geometry of the network connecting players. Rather, it is indirectly
related to the network modelling approach and reﬂects the structural coordination problem that plagues
decentralized procedures of network formation. Indeed, because network relationships are intransitive by
nature,25 robustness checks to a single player link deviations yield, in general, to a broad array of stable
geometric arrangements of bilateral links. Therefore, acknowledging the role of the social setting in crime
behavior with a model where the details of the network structure matter (as we do here) is bound to produce
a multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes.
23Note, though, that creating this link would trigger a dynamic process of link addition converging to the complete network,
which Pareto dominates the original network in terms of criminal payoﬀs.
24Note also the central role played in our analysis by the subgraphs induced on subsets of agents by the original graph, and
the (potential) multiplicity of network architecture that such subgraphs may display.
25That is, when player i is directly linked to player j, and player j is directly linked to player k, it does not necessarily imply
that player i is directly linked with player k.
14Appendix
1. Exogenous networks
Proof of Lemma 1: First, recall that πi (0,e −i)=w, for all e−i. Suppose that πi (e e) >wfor some e e.
Necessarily, e ei > 0. Then, πi (e e)=di (e e,φ,g)=( 1− φ)e ei(1 −
P
j∈N e ej) − φe ei
P
j∈N(1 − gij)e ej >w .G i v e n
that both (1 − φ)e ei ≤ 0 and −φe ei
P
j∈N (1 − gij)e ej ≤ 0, necessarily 1 −
P
j∈N e ej < 0, which implies that
yi (e e) < 0.




















i, i ∈ N. We obtain a linear system




(1 − φgij)ej =1− φ,i∈ N (4)
that we can write in matrix form M (φ,g) · e =( 1− φ)1n,w h e r emii =2 , mij =1− φgij for all i 6= j and
10
n =( 1 ,...,1).D e n o t eb ydet(M (φ,g)) the determinant of M (φ,g). We show that there exists some ﬁnite
set Z ∈ IR such that det(M (φ,g)) 6=0 , for all φ / ∈ Z and for all g on N.
Consider some network g. It is readily checked that det(M (φ,g)) is a polynomial in φ of degree smaller
than n.26 Therefore, det(M (φ,g)) has at most n diﬀerent roots
n
e φ1 (g),...,e φm (g)
o







=0for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Given that there are exactly 2
n(n−1)
2 diﬀerent networks g on N,
the set of values Z of φ such that det(M (φ,g)) = 0 for some g on N is ﬁnite, with |Z| ≤ n2
n(n−1)
2 .
Proof of Lemma 3: Consider some network g.W h e n φ =0 , the unique solution to (2) is such that
e∗
i > 0.B y c o n t i n u i t y , t h e r e e x i s t s 0 < ε(g) ≤ 1 such that the solutions to this system of equations are
non-negative for all φ ∈ (0,ε(g)).L e tgN such that gN
ij =1 , for all i 6= j.L e tφ =m i n
©
ε(g) | g ⊆ gNª
.B y
construction, 0 < φ ≤ 1 and the solutions to (2) are all non-negative for all g on N whenever φ ∈ (0,φ).
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1 :If there exists some S ⊂ N such that m(φ,S) >m(φ,S) ≥ 0,t h e nP r o p o s i t i o n
1 applies. Otherwise, all agents working is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Example with n =4agents located on a circle: Let N = {1,2,3,4}. For all subset S ⊂ N of agents,
let e∗ (g(S)) denote the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium proﬁle where only agents in S are criminals, while
agents in N\S are workers. The network connecting criminals is then g(S), that is, the network induced by
g on S. Specializing and solving the equilibrium equations (2) of Γ∗ (φ,g0) for all induced network g0 ⊂ g,
26Indeed, det(M (φ,g)) is a polynomial of highest degree in φ when gij =1for all i 6= j,i nw h i c hc a s edet(M (φ,g)) =
(1 + φ)n + n(1 − φ)(1+φ)n−1, which is a polynomial in φ of degree exactly n.
15we obtain the following equilibrium eﬀort levels:
































5−2φ 0 0 0 0 0
Simple algebra shows that e∗
1 (g(1)) >e ∗
1 (g(1,2)) >e ∗
1 (g(1,3)) >e ∗
1 (g(1,2,3)) >e ∗
1 (g).A l s o ,
e∗
2 (g(1,2,3)) >e ∗
1 (g(1,3)) is equivalent to 2φ
2 +2 φ − 1 > 0. This polynomial of order two in φ has




/2 contained in (0,1), and the inequality holds if and only if φ > e φ.
We thus have the following inequalities:
(
e∗
1 (g(1)) >e ∗
1 (g(1,2)) >e ∗
1 (g(1,3)) >e ∗
2 (g(1,2,3)) >e ∗
1 (g(1,2,3)) >e ∗
1 (g),i f0 < φ < e φ
e∗
1 (g(1)) >e ∗
1 (g(1,2)) >e ∗
2 (g(1,2,3)) >e ∗
1 (g(1,3)) >e ∗
1 (g(1,2,3)) >e ∗
1 (g),i fe φ < φ < 1
for some uniquely deﬁned e φ ∈ (0,1). From these inequalities, we deduce the following:




























Proof of Proposition 3: Let S be the set of active criminals. Suppose that g(S)=gS. Then, the




2+( |S| − 1)(1 − φ)
, for all i ∈ S.
Suppose now that player i cuts some of the existing links ij in gS. The resulting network is gS − ij.
Solving equations (2) yields the following equilibrium payoﬀs for criminal i in the pool S connected by gS−ij:
π∗
i(gS − ij)=
(1 − φ)(1 + φ)
6+3 ( |S| − 3)(1 − φ) − 2(|S| − 2)(1 − φ)2.
Then, π∗
i(gS) ≥ π∗
i(gS − ij) is equivalent to
f(φ)=( 3|S| − 5)(1 − φ)2 − (3|S| − 11)(1 − φ) − 6 ≤ 0.
Given that f00(φ) > 0, f(0) = 0 and f(1) < 0,t h i si st r u e
Endogenous networks with n =4agents: For each network conﬁguration on N = {1,2,3,4},w e
specialize and solve for the equilibrium equations (4). We analyze separately three cases with, respectively,
two, three and four criminals. For each case, we establish the sequence of improving networks g → g0,w h e r e
16g0 improves upon g if either (a) two agents i and j in g such that ij / ∈ g mutually gain by linking each other,
and g0 = g ∪ {ij},o r(b) one player in g unilaterally gains by seceding some existing links ij1,...ij m ∈ g,
and g0 = g\{ij1,...,ij m}.














































































Given the previous sequences of improving paths, we can restrict to the following network conﬁgurations
































































10−8φ 0 0 0 0
















(1 − φ)(2 − φ)
10 − 8φ
, for all φ ∈ (0,1)
from which we deduce the pairwise-subgame perfect Nash equilibrium networks when m>
√
w ≥m,f o rt h e
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